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Abstract
According to Lynne Rudder Baker’s Practical Realism, we know that
we have beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes independent of
any scientific investigation. Propositional attitudes are an indispensable
part of our everyday conception of the world and not in need of scientific
validation. This paper asks what is the nature of the attitudes such that
we may know them so well from a commonsense perspective. I argue for a
self-ascriptivist view, on which we have propositional attitudes in virtue
of ascribing them to ourselves. On this view, propositional attitudes are
derived representational states, deriving their contents and their attitude
types from our self-ascriptions.
Keywords: propositional attitudes, intentionality, naturalism, commonsense
realism, Practical Realism, Lynne Rudder Baker
Much discussion in philosophy of mind and cognitive science in the 1980s and
1990s has centered on the question of realism about the propositional attitudes
posited by commonsense psychology. On the one hand, realists like Jerry Fodor
(1987) argue that propositional attitudes—states like a belief that grass is green,
a desire to eat ice cream, and a hope that global warming does not kill us
all—are physically-realized in our brains. On the other hand, instrumentalists
∗Forthcoming in Luis R. G. Oliveira and Kevin Corcoran (eds.) Commonsense Metaphysics:
Essays in Honor of Lynne Rudder Baker. Oxford University Press.
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like Daniel Dennett (1987) take them to be predictively useful posits with
no more reality than centers of gravity. Lynne Rudder Baker (1995) offers
a refreshingly down-to-earth alternative to both positions: the propositional
attitudes of commonsense psychology exist, but they needn’t be identified with
brain states, states of immaterial souls, or anything else. They are practically
indispensible, irreducible, and totally real.
Although I don’t entirely agree with all the details of Baker’s view, I do
agree with one key idea: propositional attitudes form an integral part of our
conception of ourselves and the world around us, and this is reason to accept
them in some form. In this paper, I propose a “self-ascriptivist” view of the
propositional attitudes posited by folk psychology, on which they exist insofar
as and because we ascribe them to ourselves. The very features of the attitudes
that make us want to accept them—their integral role in our self-conception—is
what makes them real.
I proceed as follows: §1 provides some background, §2 considers why the
issue of realism about the propositional attitudes posited by folk psychology
is particularly challenging, §3 argues for a self-ascriptivist view of occurrent
propositional attitudes whose contents go beyond the contents we consciously
entertain, and §4 extends this view to standing propositional attitudes.
1 Background
Propositional attitudes are states such as believing that grass is green, desiring
ice cream, and hoping that global warming does not kill us all. They are
standardly thought to involve a “content” and an “attitude” component. The
content of an attitude is what it “says,” is “about,” is “directed at,” or, more
generally, represents. For example, a belief that grass is green represents that
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grass is green. The attitude of a propositional attitude is the stance we take
towards the content—believing, desiring, hoping, intending, fearing, etc. It is
possible for two propositional attitudes to have the same content but difference
attitudes (e.g., Vera might believe that Santa Claus exists while Eleni desires
that Santa Claus exist) and two propositional attitudes might have the same
attitude but different contents (e.g., Vera might believe that Santa Claus exists
while Eleni believes that Pegasus exists). In this paper, I am concerned with the
propositional attitudes that form an integral part of our commonsense conception
of ourselves and others—the beliefs and desires we take ourselves and others
to have and that we take to explain and predict their behavior—and set aside
any propositional attitudes that do not play a role in commonsense psychology,
such as inaccessible attitudes, subpersonal attitudes, and conscious attitudes
with contents we cannot in any sense articulate. For convenience, I will restrict
the use of the term “propositional attitudes” to apply only to the propositional
attitudes of commonsense psychology.
Propositional attitudes come in occurrent and standing varieties. Occurrent
propositional attitudes are propositional attitudes that we count as having while
they “occur” to us—a passing thought that grass is green, a sudden realization
that you forgot your wallet at home, a prolonged rumination on the reality of
climate change. In contrast, standing propositional attitudes are propositional
attitudes that we count as having even while they do not “occur” to us, such as
a belief that the Acropolis is in Athens that you have even while you are not
thinking it, a desire to invite your friend over for dinner that you count as having
even when you are not thinking about your friend or dinner, and an intention to
get some ice cream after work that you are not constantly running through your
mind throughout the work day.
A few notes: First, as I am using the term, propositional attitudes are
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“cognitive” as opposed to perceptual or other sensory states. This, of course, is not
to deny that commonsense psychology posits perceptual or other sensory states
nor that such states represent.1 Second, as I am using the term, propositional
attitudes include attitudes that might end up not having propositional contents,
such as a desire for ice cream or a love of Santa Claus.2 Third, I am using the
notion of content loosely such that all representational states—states that consist
in the representing of a content—need not form a natural kind.
2 The Trouble with Propositional Attitudes
It has sometimes been thought that there is a live question as to whether
propositional attitudes are real: propositional attitudes are part of our folk or
commonsense conception of ourselves and the world. But this conception might
be mistaken and so its posits might not exist. It is for this reason that much
discussion on the attitudes assumed that realism about propositional attitudes
requires that commonsense psychology be vindicated by more rigorous scientific
investigation (see especially Fodor 1987)—and it is precisely this assumption
that Baker rejects.
One might suggest that propositional attitudes are not mere posits of com-
monsense psychology. We are also introspectively acquainted with them: we can
tell just by introspection that we have certain beliefs, desires, and other such
states. If so, realism about propositional attitudes would not require any scientific
vindication. Compare: We are introspectively acquainted with consciousness,
so realism about consciousness needs no scientific vindication. Considering the
1Indeed, in Mendelovici 2018a, appendix D, I argue that the account of propositional
attitudes I offer here can be extended to perception and in Mendelovici 2013b and Mendelovici
2013a I argue for a representationalist view of moods and emotions.
2Whether there are such non-propositional attitudes is a matter of contention, but this
does not affect my main points. See Grzankowski and Montague 2018 for a collection of papers
on the topic and Mendelovici 2018b for my favored way of construing the debate.
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analogous suggestion that realism about propositional attitudes can likewise be
supported will not only help us see why realism about propositional attitudes
is reasonably thought to depend on scientific vindication but also help us get
clear on the kinds of contents propositional attitudes are thought to have, which
will give us a clearer idea of what exactly realism about propositional attitudes
involves.
The problem with the suggestion that we are introspectively acquainted
with propositional attitudes is that, while I agree that we are acquainted with
something, what we are acquainted with does not answer to the commonsense
psychological notion of a propositional attitude. For one, we are not introspec-
tively acquainted with standing propositional attitudes—the mental states we
are acquainted with are all occurrent. But even the occurrent states we are
acquainted with do not answer to the commonsense notion of a propositional
attitude. The clearest way to see this is to consider the contents that we are
introspectively acquainted with in having an occcurrent state. For example,
suppose you consciously and occurrently believe that the mental supervenes on
the physical. In this case, you are arguably acquainted with something. This
something might answer to the notion of content in that it’s the “saying” or
representing of something.3 It might include some perceptual or verbal imagery
or even a gisty or partial grasp of the notions involved in your belief, like that of
supervenience. Let us call this content that you are introspectively acquainted
with, whatever it is, your immediate content. The problem is that your im-
mediate content does not include the full content of the propositional attitude
that is posited by commonsense psychology. For instance, it does not include
your full understanding of supervenience, though it might include some gisty or
partial understanding of the notion. Still, when I try to predict your behavior
3For an argument for this claim, see Mendelovici 2018a, §7.2.1.
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(say, which questions you will ask at the talk on dualism), I attribute to you a
belief with the full understanding, and when I assess your beliefs as rational or
not, I hold you accountable for a belief with the full understanding. If this is
right, then commonsense psychology at least sometimes posits rich descriptive
contents—e.g., your full understanding of supervenience, which might consist in a
definition or other characterization of supervenience—that outrun the immediate
contents we are introspectively acquainted with.
There is a second way in which the contents posited by commonsense psy-
chology outrun our immediate contents. Some of the contents of the attitudes
posited by commonsense psychology are object-involving contents, contents that
involve particular objects. But we arguably are not introspectively aware of
such objects.4 For example, you might take me to believe that George is a
bachelor, where George himself—the flesh-and-blood person—is supposed to
be a constituent of my belief’s content. Since, arguably, George is not part
of whatever content I’m introspectively acquainted with, this is another way
in which the contents of the propositional attitudes posited by commonsense
psychology go beyond our immediate contents.
If we also assume—plausibly, I think—that immediate contents are narrow,
in that which contents we are immediately aware of depends on our intrinsic
properties, then there is a third way in which the contents of commonsense
psychological propositional attitudes go beyond our immediate contents. Thought
experiments such as those of Putnam (1975) and Burge (1986) are taken to be
intuitively forceful, which suggests that our commonsense psychological content
attributions are broad in that they are not narrow. If so, then they are not our
immediate contents.
4This is a contentious claim, which I have argued for elsewhere (Mendelovici 2018a). Note
that this claim is compatible with the claim that we are introspectively acquainted with
contents with a singular form (Mendelovici 2018b).
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If all this is right, then introspection does not provide independent access to
the propositional attitudes of commonsense psychology. This makes it reasonable
to assume that realism about the attitudes requires scientific vindication. From
this, we can also get a better idea of what realism about the attitudes requires:
we must, at a minimum, capture the rich descriptive, object-involving, and broad
contents that commonsense psychology ascribes.
Elsewhere, I have proposed an account of immediate contents in terms of
phenomenal intentionality (Mendelovici 2018a, §7.2.4, 2019). On this account,
our immediate contents are phenomenal contents, contents the representation of
which is nothing over above the having of certain phenomenal states. For example,
the immediate content of a thought about George might include some perceptual
imagery, which is nothing over and above certain perceptual phenomenal states.
Similarly, the immediate content of a thought about supervenience might include
a gisty or partial grasp of a definition of supervenience, which might be nothing
over and above certain cognitive phenomenal states.5
For present purposes, however, we needn’t endorse the account of immediate
contents in terms of phenomenal intentionality. Our concern is not with immedi-
ate contents but with the contents of the propositional attitudes of commonsense
psychology, which, as we’ve seen, go beyond our immediate contents. In what
follows, I will offer an account of propositional attitudes in terms of dispositions
to entertain immediate contents. Immediate contents will play a role in this
acccount, but how we ultimately account for them is left open.
5While I do accept that there is such thing as cognitive phenomenology, phenomenology
that outruns any sensory phenomenology, this is not strictly speaking required by the view
that immediate contents are phenomenally represented (see Mendelovici 2018a, §7.2.4).
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3 Self-Ascriptivism about Occurrent Propositional
Attitudes
So far, we have seen that propositional attitudes are posited by commonsense
psychology and that we are not introspectively acquainted with them (though
we are introspectively acquainted with some contentful states—those of having
certain immediate contents). The fact that we are not introspectively acquainted
with the attitudes suggests that it is reasonable to think that realism about
the attitudes must be vindicated by science. Baker staunchly denies this claim,
arguing that propositional attitudes need no scientific vindication—their practical
utility is vindication enough. Baker’s realism about propositional attitudes stems
from a larger metaphysical perspective, which she calls “Practical Realism” (1995,
2001, 2007a). According to Practical Realism, our everyday practices provide
knowledge of the world around us, allowing us to infer the real existence of items
that are usefully assumed to be real by commonsense. Baker writes: “[T]here
is no better mark of reality than the utility, realiability, and indispensability of
the commonsense conception.” (1995, p. 228) Practical Realism finds application
in the case of the propositional attitudes of commonsense psychology. Not only
do the attitudes play a role in our psychological explanations of cognition and
behavior but, further, they permeate our entire understanding of much of the
commonsense world. Baker writes:
The attitudes are woven into the fabric of all social, legal, political,
and other institutions. Nothing would be a contract or an invitation
to dinner or an election or a death sentence in the absence of beliefs,
desires, and intentions. Without attribution of propositional atti-
tudes, there would be no justifying, excusing, praising, or blaming
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one another. (Baker 1995, 4–5, footnote suppressed)6
While I do not endorse Baker’s Practical Realism wholesale,7 I do agree that
propositional attitudes form part of an integral conception of ourselves as thinking,
reasoning, and epistemically assessable persons and that this gives us reason to
accept their existence. The reason propositional attitude realism can be defended
in this way, I want to suggest, stems from the very nature of the attitudes: they
are self-ascriptions.
On the view I will propose, ascribing contents to our immediate contents,
our internal states, or ourselves as persons is necessary and sufficient for the
aforementioned items to derivatively represent those contents—where derived
representation is representation that is at least partially constituted, grounded in,
or identical to other instances of representation—and the propositional attitudes
of commonsense psychology are nothing over and above such self-ascriptions.8
We can divide the overall view as it applies to occurrent propositional
attitudes into two claims: The first is that our immediate contents, internal
states, or selves at least sometimes derivatively represent some contents. The
second is that at least some of these derivatively represented contents are, ground,
or constitute the occurrent propositional attitudes of commonsense psychology.
I argue for the first claim in the next subsection and the second claim in the two
subsections that follow. Section 4 turns to standing propositional attitudes.
6Baker follows up on this theme in later work on the metaphysics of everyday objects. In
her 2006 paper “Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality,” she identifies a class of everyday
objects that are “intention-dependent,” dependent on commonsense psychological states.
7Even if we take useful commonsense views as a starting point in inquiry, if the usefulness
and causal origins of many commonsense beliefs can be explained without assuming the truth
of those beliefs, this debunks our reasons for holding them.
8I present such a self-ascriptivist view of occurrent and standing state contents in more
detail in Mendelovici 2018a, chapters 7–8, and 2019.
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3.1 Derived Mental Representation
Here is a sketch of an argument for the first claim, the claim that our immediate
contents or other internal items at least sometimes derivatively represent some
contents:
1. Ascribing a content to something is metaphysically sufficient for that thing
to derivatively represent that content.
2. We at least sometimes ascribe a content to our immediate contents, internal
states, or selves.
3. Therefore, our immediate contents, internal states, or selves at least some-
times derivatively represent some contents.
Premise (1) is supported by paradigm cases of derived representation, such
as those of stop signs and words. A stop sign means <stop!> because we in
some sense stipulate, endorse, or accept that it does. Likewise, the word “dog”
means <dog> because we stipulate, endorse, or accept that it does. In short,
we might say that in these cases, a vehicle of derived representation (a stop sign
or a word) gets its derived content from our ascriptions, which include tacit or
explicit stipulations, endorsements, acceptances, and so on. If this is right, then
ascribing a content to a vehicle of representation is metaphysically sufficient
for that vehicle to derivatively represent. More precisely, the following claim is
true:
(Ascriptivism) Necessarily, if S ascribes content C to O, O derivatively represents
C (for S).9
9I also think that ascribing a content is metaphysically necessary for derived representa-
tion—it is not possible for a vehicle to derivatively represent a content in the absence of such
ascriptions. If so, then accounts of derived representation that do not appeal to ascriptions
fail to deliver metaphysically sufficient conditions for derived representation. See Mendelovici
2018a, §8.2, for related arguments against views of non-phenomenal intentionality in terms of
derived representation.
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In some cases, our ascriptions are what we might call direct: they ascribe a
content that is contained within the ascription itself. For example, I might
stipulate that the pen that I’m holding stands for the proposition that grass is
green. But in other cases, our ascriptions are indirect: they ascribe a content
that is not contained within the ascription itself, e.g., by deferring to experts, the
community, or even the world to specify which content is ascribed. For example,
I might stipulate that the pen that I’m holding stands for the tallest person
within 20km of me, whoever it turns out to be, or that my word “arthritis” means
whatever the experts mean by “arthritis.”10 In these cases, I have succeeded
in ascribing a content to my pen or to the word “arthritis”, but I have not
entertained that content myself.
Premise (2) states that we at least sometimes ascribe a content to our
immediate contents, internal states, or selves—in short, we at least sometimes
self-ascribe contents. There are various ways in which we might do this. Here, I
will describe one way, which I take to be fairly undemanding. A key notion in
my account is that of a cashing out thought, a thought (or other representational
state) that specifies that a content is at least partly elucidated by, unpacked into,
precisified as, expanded into, or more generally, cashed out into another content.
For example, suppose you think to yourself that George is a bachelor. Suppose
you then ask yourself what you mean by <bachelor>. You might have a cashing
out thought with the content <by <bachelor>, I mean <unmarried man>>.
This thought specifies that one content, <bachelor>, cashes out into another
content, <unmarried man>. Note that I could have also broken this thought
up into two separate cashing out thoughts, each partially specifying what I
take <bachelor> to cash out into, e.g., <part of what I mean by <bachelor> is
something satisfying <unmarried> and <the only other part of what I mean by
10I am alluding here to Burge’s (1979) well-known thought experiment.
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<bachelor> is something satisfying <man>>.
Having such cashing out thoughts is one way to ascribe a content to another
content. For example, by thinking <by <bachelor>, I mean <unmarried man>>,
I thereby ascribe the content <unmarried man> to <bachelor>. But, I want
to suggest, merely being disposed to have cashing out thoughts after sufficient
reflection is enough for ascription. Even if I never actually have a cashing out
thought specifying that <bachelor> cashes out into <unmarried man>, the mere
fact that I am disposed to have this cashing out thought (after sufficient reflection)
is enough for me to count as ascribing <unmarried man> to <bachelor>. If all
this is right, then being disposed to have cashing out thoughts is another way
in which we can self-ascribe contents, one that is less demanding than actually
having cashing out thoughts.
Do we have the relevant dispositions? I want to suggest that we do. When
we think, for instance, <the mental supervenes on the physical>, we might not
entertain the full definition of supervenience, but we are disposed to produce
such a definition if needed. In effect, thought is “symbolic” in that we often use
one mental item—in this case, a content—to stand for another. We don’t always
entertain our fully cashed out contents—that might be too inefficient or even
psychologically impossible given our cognitive limitations—but we do the next
best thing: we use other contents as mental “tags” for these fully cashed out
contents. This is good enough for many purposes. And when we need to access
the fully cashed out content, we can.11
This picture allows for both direct and indirect self-ascriptions. The content
<by <bachelor>, I mean <unmarried man>> contains the very content it
ascribes to <bachelor>: <unmarried man>. In contrast, the content <by
11For other variants of the view that concepts have both “thicker” and “thinner” contents,
see Barsalou 1993, 1999, Prinz 2002, Wickelgren 1979, 1992, Hebb 1949, Eliasmith 2013, and
Viger 2007. See Mendelovici 2018a, §7.2.3, for discussion.
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<bachelor>, I mean an unmarried man> does not contain the content it ascribes.
The content, instead, is the referent of the content <unmarried man>—the
kind or property of being an unmarried man itself. In both cases, we have a
cashing out thought that specifies that some content, C, cashes out into some
further content, C+. The difference between the two cases is that in that of
direct self-ascription, the content that picks out C+ is or includes C+ itself—the
content is mentioned in the cashing out thought itself. In the case of indirect
self-ascription, the content that picks out C+ is some further content, D, that
refers to C+. This is precisely analogous to direct and indirect ascriptions of
contents to vehicles in the non-mental case.12
Which contents we self-ascribe might be indeterminate. This is because what
counts as sufficient reflection has been left unspecified, leaving the conditions
of manifestation of the relevant dispositions underspecified. In different circum-
stances, we might have different cashing out thoughts. For example, in some
circumstances, we might have cashing out thoughts that specify that <bachelor>
cashes out into <unmarried man>, whereas in other circumstances, we might
have cashing out thoughts that specify that <bachelor> cashes out into <man
available for marriage>. In some circumstances we might have cashing out
thoughts yielding direct self-ascriptions, while in others we have cashing out
thoughts yielding indirect self-ascriptions. As a result, there is some indetermi-
nacy in which contents we derivatively represent and, further, in which occurrent
propositional attitudes we count as having. This indeterminacy, I want to sug-
gest, is a feature, not a bug. Which precise occurrent propositional attitudes
we count as having is indeterminate. For example, it might be indeterminate
whether in thinking <George is a bachelor> I am thinking that George belongs
12Of course, the story about indirect self-ascription presupposes an account of reference,
which I have not here provided. See Mendelovici 2018a, §9.3.4 and appendix H, and Mendelovici
MS for an account congenial to the self-ascriptivist picture.
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to a class that excludes popes, 17-year-old boys, or other items that might be
classified as bachelors on some cashings out but not others.
One might wonder how exactly cashing out thoughts themselves get their
contents. (One might also wonder whether cashing out thoughts have a particular
attitude component and how we can account for it, a question I will return to in
the next subsection.) Recall that my eventual aim is to provide an account of the
propositional attitudes of commonsense psychology in terms of self-ascriptions
such as the ones described here. But then, on pain of circularity, cashing out
thoughts cannot merely be such propositional attitudes and the contents in virtue
of which they play their self-ascriptive roles contents cannot just be the contents
of such attitudes. I want to suggest, instead, that the contents of cashing out
thoughts in virtue of which they play their self-ascriptive roles are immediate
contents. On this suggestion, for example, the content <by <bachelor>, I mean
<unmarried man>> is immediately represented.13 This requires that contents
like <unmarried man> can be immediately represented. More generally, what
we can directly and indirectly self-ascribe depends on what we can immediately
represent: we can directly self-ascribe only contents that we can immediately
represent and we can indirectly self-ascribe only contents that are the referents
of contents we can immediately represent. How constraining this is depends on
which contents we think we can immediately represent and our favored theory of
reference. If we think we can only immediately represent perceptual or sensory
contents, then we get a kind of empiricism about derived content on which we
can only derivatively represent contents constructed out of perceptual or sensory
contents and their referents.14
13These immediate contents will have to involve ways of mentioning rather than using
contents, since both <bachelor> and <unmmaried man> are mentioned rather than used
in this construction. This might be a matter of inner demonstrations of contents that we
are acquainted with, a special kind of attention to such contents, or the embedding of such
contents into higher-order thoughts.
14If we can perceptually represent the relation of causation, this empiricist view ends up
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I have argued for premise (2) by arguing that we at least sometimes self-ascribe
contents to our immediate contents. Combined with premise (1), the claim that
such ascriptions are metaphysically sufficient for derived representation, we
obtain our conclusion, that there are mental cases of derived representation.
When we self-ascribe contents—e.g., by being disposed to have cashing out
thoughts specifying that one immediately represented content cashes out into
another content—we thereby derivatively represent the self-ascribed content.15
In the previous section, I considered the view that immediate contents are
phenomenal contents. If we combine self-ascriptivism with this phenomenal
intentionality theoretic account of immediate contents, we arrive at a view com-
patible with the phenomenal intentionality theory, the view that all intentionality
is phenomenal intentionality or derived from phenomenal intentionality.16 How-
ever, again, as far as the purpose of this paper is concerned, the phenomenal
intentionality theoretic account of immediate contents is an optional extra.
being quite powerful, allowing us to derivatively represent the referents of descriptive contents
like <the cause of THIS experience>. Even if we do not perceptually represent causation, the
view can also be quite powerful if combined with a causal theory of reference, allowing us to
derivatively represent the external-world causes of states of representing particular immediate
contents. This latter approach is not one that I endorse, however.
15Is derived mental representation the same kind of thing as the having of immediate
contents? I don’t think so, though both answer to the vague notion of “targeting a content.”
One difference between them is that derived representation is always relative to an ascriber.
Just as stop signs represent <stop!> for us and not for cats or in and of themselves, your
immediate contents derivatively represent their derived contents for you and not for someone
else or in and of themselves. Another difference between immediate and derived representation
is that it can be indeterminate what we derivatively represent but it cannot be indeterminate
what we immediately represent. See Mendelovici 2018a, §7.4, for discussion.
16Advocates of the view include Searle (1990, 1992), Strawson (1994, 2008), Pitt (1999, 2004),
Horgan and Tienson (2002), Loar (2003), Kriegel (2003, 2007, 2011), Farkas (2008a, 2008b),
Horgan and Graham (2009), Chalmers (2010), Pautz (2010), Montague (2010), Bourget (2010,
2017b, 2018), and Mendelovici (2010, 2018a). See Kriegel 2013, Mendelovici and Bourget 2014,
and Bourget and Mendelovici 2016 for overviews of the view.
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3.2 Self-Ascribing the Contents of Occurrent Propositional
Attitudes
So far, I have argued that many of our immediate thought contents derivatively
represent further contents, which we ascribe to them thanks to our dispositions
to have cashing out thoughts. In this and the next subsection, I want to suggest
that these self-ascribed contents capture our occurrent propositional attitudes.
In this subsection, I argue that these self-ascribed contents include many of
the contents we ascribe to occurrent propositional attitudes, including rich
descriptive, object-involving, and broad contents. In the next subsection, I show
how we can extend this picture to capture the attitude component of occurrent
propositional attitudes.
One way in which the self-ascriptivist picture allows us to derivatively rep-
resent rich descriptive contents is by direct self-ascription. The example of
being disposed to have a cashing out thought specifying that <bachelor> cashes
out into <unmarried man> is an example of such direct self-ascription. We
might likewise be disposed to have cashing out thoughts specifying that <su-
pervenience> cashes out into some definition of supervenience, that <bird>
cashes out into some characterization of birds, or that <George> cashes out
into some uniquely identifying description of the flesh-and-blood George. As
these examples illustrate, the relevant rich descriptive contents are not limited
to definitions, understood as specifications of metaphysically necessary and
sufficient conditions for concept application, but can also include categorizations
that are not intended to fix reference (such as a characterization of birds in
terms of their protoypical features) and mere reference-fixing descriptions (such
as descriptions that fix reference to an item via its contingent features). Which
of these rich descriptive contents we derivatively represent depends on precisely
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which cashing out thoughts we are disposed to have.
We can also derivatively represent rich descriptive contents using indirect
self-ascriptions. For example, I might be disposed to have a cashing out thought
with the content <by <plus> I mean whatever mathematicians mean by the
word “plus”>. Suppose that what mathematicians mean by “plus” is a rich
descriptive content. Then, <plus> derivatively represents that rich descriptive
content.
One important way in which we derivatively represent object-involving con-
tents is by indirect self-ascription. For example, I might be disposed to have
a cashing out thought with the content <by <Eleni>, I mean my first child>.
Since the content <my first child> is used rather than mentioned, it has its
usual referent, which, presumaby, is Eleni herself. I thereby derivatively rep-
resent the object-involving content that is Eleni herself. In the same way, we
can derivatively represent object-involving contents involving kinds, properties,
states of affairs, and other worldly items.
The only way we can derivatively represent object-involving contents that we
cannot immediately represent is through indirect self-ascription, along the lines
described in the previous paragraph. But if there are object-involving contents
that we can immediately represent, then we can also derivatively represent
them through direct self-ascription. For example, on some views, our immediate
contents include abstract properties, like blueness and roundness.17 On such
views, we can derivatively represent object-involving contents involving these
abstract properties by directly ascribing them to some other immediate contents.
More plausibly (in my opinion, at least), we might be able to represent our own
conscious states, our selves, or the present time or location with object-involving
contents that include these items themselves as components. If so, then these
17For views of this sort, see Byrne 2001, Pautz 2007, and Bourget 2017a, 2019, forthcoming.
This is a view that I reject, however (see Mendelovici 2018a, chapter 9).
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contents are object-involving contents that can be derivatively represented using
direct self-ascriptions.
Let us now turn to broad contents, contents that are not entirely determined
by the intrinsic properties of subjects. There are two ways in which we can
derivatively represent broad contents. First, we might have self-ascriptions that
are determined by our intrinsic properties but that self-ascribe different contents
depending on environmental factors. For example, chemically-ignorant Oscar
and his Twin Earth intrinsic duplicate, Toscar, might both be disposed to have
a cashing out thought with the content <by <water>, I mean the clear, liquid,
potable stuff found in rivers, streams, seas and oceans around the location of this
thought>. What Oscar and Toscar derivatively represent depends on what plays
the water role in their respective environments. In Oscar’s environment, it’s
H2O, while in Toscar’s environment it’s some other substance, XYZ. So, Oscar
and Toscar’s water-related thoughts represent different derived contents—they
are broad.18
What we derivatively represent can also be sensitive to environmental factors
if which dispositions we count as having depends on our environment. Suppose
that Oscar and Toscar are intrinsic duplicates who live in 2020 and are both
disposed to Google “water” before having a cashing out thought specifying
what they mean by their immediate content <water>. Suppose further that,
due to the different results they would get upon Googling “water,” Oscar and
Toscar are thereby disposed to have different cashing out thoughts upon sufficient
reflection: Oscar is disposed to have a cashing out thought with the content
<by <water>, I mean <H2O>>, while Toscar is disposed to have a cashing
out thought with the content <by <water>, I mean <XYZ>>. Since what
Oscar’s and Toscar’s water-related immediate contents derivatively represent
18This is, of course, a variant of Putnam’s (1975) well-known Twin Earth thought experiment.
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partly depends on their environment, these contents are broad. Interestingly, this
example shows that not all broad contents need be object-involving or obtained
via indirect self-ascriptions.
I have shown how we can derivatively represent rich descriptive, object-
involving, and broad contents, which are some of the contents of the propositional
attitudes of commonsense psychology. Of course, which particular contents of
these sorts we represent depends on which dispositions to have cashing out
thoughts we have. If we do not have dispositions to have cashing out thoughts
ascribing, say, object-involving contents, then we do not derivatively represent
those contents. This leads to the worry that perhaps we do not in fact have the
dispositions required to derivatively represent the contents of the propositional
attitudes ascribed by commonsense psychology. In response, I want to suggest
that the very fact that we intuitively think that propositional attitudes represent
rich descriptive, object-involving, and broad contents is reason to think that we
derivatively represent those contents. To make this point more precisely, let us
distinguish between two different kinds of intuitions about which contents we
represent: first-order intuitions, which are are intuitions about particular actual
or merely possible cases (e.g., about the case of Oscar and Toscar), and theoretical
intuitions, which are intuitions about which theories of content determination are
correct (e.g., a theoretical intuition that all content is narrow). I want to suggest
that first-order intuitions largely stem from the same source as our dispositions
to have cashing out thoughts. These intuitions are intuitions about what we
represent in particular cases, intuitions that we obtain from imagining those
cases from a first-person perspective or that at least are congruent with those
that we would have upon imagining them from a first-person perspective. It
is plausible that when we imagine cases from the first-person perspective, we
manifest our dispositions to have cashing out thoughts, the very dispositions
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that make these first-order intuitions true. In contrast, our theoretical intuitions
might be driven by other factors. However, insofar as commonsense psychology
respects our first-order intuitions, there is reason to think that the contents we
derivatively represent align with the contents it ascribes.19
This line of response is very much is in line with a theme in Baker’s writing:
Baker insists that we should take seriously what she calls the “first-person
perspective” (1998, 2007b, 2013), which she describes as “a perspective from
which one thinks of oneself as an individual facing the world, as a subject distinct
from everything else” (1998, p. 328, footnote suppressed) and “the perspective
from which one thinks of oneself as oneself*” (2007b, p. 203, emphasis in original),
i.e., “without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or
other referential device.” (2007b, p. 203) While, for Baker, any sentient creature
has a first-person perspective in the weak sense of having perspectival experiences
“with itself as the center” (1998, p. 332), only a self-conscious being has a first-
person perspective in the stronger sense of being “able to think of herself as
herself*, and of her thoughts as her own*.” (1998, p. 332) For Baker, the first-
person perspective is a crucial part of our understanding of the world, and any
naturalistic outlook ought to take it seriously.
3.3 Self-Ascribing the Attitudes of Occurrent Propositional
Attitudes
So far, I have argued that we derivatively represent the contents of many of the
occurrent propositional attitudes posited by commonsense psychology. But I have
not yet said anything about the attitude component of occurrent propositional
attitudes, about what makes an occurrent belief a belief and an occurrent desire
a desire.
19See also Mendelovici 2018a, §7.3.3, especially fn. 37.
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There are various views of attitudes: On one view, attitude functionalism,
a propositional attitude’s attitude is nothing over and above its functional
role (Fodor 1987). On another view, attitude phenomenalism, a propositional
attitude’s attitude is nothing over and above its phenomenal properties (Jorba
2016). On a third view, attitude representationalism, a propositional attitude’s
attitude is nothing over and above its (derived or underived) representational
features (Pearce 2016, Mendelovici 2018a, appendix E, Montague MS).
My favored view is attitude representationalism. According to one way of
fleshing out the view, different types of attitudes have characteristic contents in
addition to the contents we normally attribute to them. For example, a belief
that it is raining might simply be a representational state with the content
<it is true that it is raining> or <it is a fact that it is raining>. This state
includes both the “that-clause” content <it is raining> as well as a further
content characteristic of belief stating that the that-clause content is true or is a
fact. Similarly, a desire that it rain might be a representational state with the
content <it is good that it is raining>.20
One reason to favor attitude representationalism offered by Pearce (2016,
chapter 3) is that it best explains the explanatory and rational roles of attitudes.
For example, consider the following example of a belief-desire pair and a belief-
belief pair, which is modified from Pearce 2016, p. 8:
(BD) Sue desires that she get the job.
Sue believes that if she bribes the recruiter then she will get the job.
(BB) Sue believes that she will get the job.
Sue believes that if she bribes the recruiter then she will get the job.
20One challenge for attitude representationalism is that of distinguishing between desires
and beliefs that something is good. One way to distinguish the two is to say that they strictly
speaking have different contents. For example, Pearce (2016) suggests that desires but not
beliefs represent things as “rewarding,” where rewardingness is a content special to desires.
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Suppose Sue bribes the recruiter. The belief-desire pair in (BD), but not the
belief-belief pair in (BB), would explain and rationalize Sue’s behavior. Why is
this? Attitude functionalism cannot explain this: since it takes a propositional
attitude’s attitude to be nothing over and above its functional role, it can’t
then explain a propositional attitude’s functional role in terms of its attitude.
As Pearce puts it, attitude representationalism gets the order of explanation
backwards: we want to say that it is because of a propositional attitude’s attitude
that it plays the roles that it does, not vice versa.
Consider now a version of attitude phenomenalism that is not also a version
of attitude representationalism, a view that takes attitudes to be a matter of
phenomenal characters that are not also representational contents—i.e., that
are “mere” qualia. Such a view also cannot make sense of why the belief-desire
pair and not the belief-belief pair explain and rationalize Sue’s behavior. On
such a view, the difference between Sue’s having a belief that she will get the
job and her having a desire that she get the job is merely phenomenal—the two
states feel a different way. But it is not clear why such a feeling should cause
or rationalize Sue’s bribing the recruiter in the belief-desire case but not in the
belief-belief case.
Attitude representationalism, in contrast, can make good sense of why the
belief-desire pair but not the belief-belief pair explain and rationalize Sue’s
behavior. Sue’s having a desire to get the job is a matter of her representing a
content like <my getting the job is good>, while Sue’s having a belief that she
will get the job is a matter of her representing a content like <it is a fact that I
will get the job>. Sue’s belief that if she bribes the recruiter she will get the job
has a content like <it is a fact that if I bribe the recruiter, I will get the job>.
From the belief-desire pair, but not from the belief-belief pair, Sue can conclude
that bribing the recruiter is good, which explains and rationalizes her behavior.
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Are characteristic attitude contents immediately or derivatively represented?
I want to suggest that at least in the case of occurrent propositional attitudes,
attitudes involve characteristic immediate contents. One reason to think this is
that we can at least roughly identify which attitudes we have based on intro-
spection of our present states. This immediate content plausibly distinguishes
between broad categories of attitudes like belief-like attitudes (e.g., accepting,
assuming, being certain of), desire-like attitudes (e.g., wanting, wishing, hoping),
and intention-like attitudes (e.g., deciding, stipulating, intending). But I also
want to suggest that the relevant characteristic contents might additionally have
a derived component that fleshes out the rough immediate content, determining
a more fine-grained attitude type within these broad categories. This allows us
to capture fine-grained attitudes such as hoping, wishing, aspiring, regretting,
loving, adoring, and being ashamed of.
If this is right, then the fine-grain attitudes of occurrent propositional at-
titudes are self-ascribed, just like their contents. On the overall view, then,
occurrent propositional attitudes have immediate contents, which might fix some
of the contents we want to ascribe to them as well as their coarse-grained attitude
type, but their fully specified contents and fine-grained attitude types are fixed
by their derived contents.
Before continuing, let us briefly return to the question of how to account for
the attitudes involved in cashing out thoughts themselves. In order for cashing
out thoughts to successfully self-ascribe contents, there is no specific attitude
that they must have—any broadly belief-like or intention-like attitude will do
the trick. Compare: We can make a pen derivatively represent the Pacific Ocean
by believing, accepting, intending, stipulating, or deciding that it does—more
than one kind of fine-grained attitude type can play the relevant ascriptive role.
So cashing out thoughts arguably play their self-ascriptive role thanks to their
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immediate contents and independently of any derived contents they might have.
This is fortunate, since it allows us to avoid any circularity that we would face if
their self-ascriptive role depended on their derived contents.
4 Self-Ascriptivism about Standing Propositional
Attitudes
So far, my focus has been on occurrent propositional attitudes. I now briefly
turn to standing propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes we count as
having even while they are not “occurring” in us. I want to suggest that the
self-ascriptivist account can extend to these propositional attitudes.
One way to extend the account is to simply say that standing propositional
attitudes are dispositions to have occurrent propositional attitudes with the
same immediate and derived contents. But another way is to take standing
propositional attitudes to themselves be self-ascribed. The basic idea is that
while we might be disposed to have various occurrent states, we in some sense
own up to or take as genuinely ours only some of them. These are our standing
propositional attitudes. For example, suppose I am disposed to have various
intrusive occurrent desires like that I drive off the road. However, I do not have
an underlying disposition to accept these desires as forming part of my overall
set of desires, as being genuinely mine. So, they do not count as part of my
set of standing desires. The difference between these states and the desires I
actually count as having is that I self-ascribe the latter but not the former.
On the view I want to propose, we count as having various standing proposi-
tional attitudes because we self-ascribe and hence derivatively represent them.
The view faces a complication, which it is helpful to consider at the outset: In the
case of occurrent propositional attitudes, we ascribe contents to our immediate
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contents—our immediate contents serve as the “vehicles” of derived mental
representation. This is in line with paradigm cases of derived representation
in which a vehicle of derived representation—a word, stop sign, or symbol—is
ascribed a meaning. But in the case of standing propositional attitudes, there is
no clear candidate for a vehicle of derived representation. Standing states do not
come with corresponding immediate contents or other mental items available to
serve as vehicles of derived representation. So, one might question whether they
can really be understood in terms of derived representation.
I want to suggest that, while there is no specific vehicle of derived repre-
sentation in the case of standing propositional attitudes, there is a bearer of
the derived representational properties. Let us consider first an analogy: The
words and sentences in a book derivatively represent various contents. But the
book as a whole might have further overall themes, morals, or meanings. These
further—we might say, global—contents are derivatively represented: they are
instances of representation that are derived from our own ascriptions—where else
could they come from?—though they do not have specific words or sentences as
vehicles. We might say that the book as a whole is the vehicle of representation,
but this is not to say that the book represents its global contents in the same
way that its words represent their contents—while words “stand for” or in some
sense are “symbols” for their contents, the book does not “stand for” or serve as
a “symbol” for its global contents, though it does contain them or have them in
some broader sense.21
My suggestion is that a standing propositional attitude is a global content of
oneself as a whole, analogous to a book’s global contents. We ascribe them not
to specific immediate contents or other mental items but rather to ourselves as
wholes, and what it is for us to “have” them is not for us to “stand for” them or
21Thanks to David Bourget for offering this example of non-mental derived representation
absent specific vehicles.
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serve as “symbols” for them but rather for them to belong to us or be contained
in us as a book has or contains its global contents.
On the proposed account, then, we self-ascribe beliefs, desires, and other
standing states. We do this by self-ascribing contents that include both attitude
and non-attitude content components, which, assuming attitude representation-
alism, specify both the attitude and the content of the self-ascribed state. As
in the case of occurrent propositional attitudes, there is more than one way to
self-ascribe a standing propositional attitude. One fairly undemanding way is
to be disposed to accept the attitude as your own. This might be a matter of
being disposed to have occurrent states with immediate contents stating that
you represent a particular content. If these immediate contents derivatively
represent various other contents (e.g., the rich descriptive, object-involving, and
broad contents discussed in the previous section), then these contents are also
inherited by the standing propositional states you self-ascribe. For example,
suppose you are disposed to accept that you believe that George is a bachelor
and you are disposed to have a cashing out thought specifying that <bachelor>
cashes out into <unmarried man>. Then you have a standing belief that George
is an unmarried man.
As in the case of occurrent propositional attitudes, there is reason to think
that the standing propositional attitudes we self-ascribe more or less line up
with the standing propositional attitudes we have first-order commonsense
psychological intuitions about. If so, then there is reason to think that standing
propositional attitudes, like occurrent propositional attitudes, are self-ascribed
and hence derivatively represented.
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5 Conclusion: Realism about propositional atti-
tudes
Lynne Rudder Baker claims that realism about the attitudes is in no need of
scientific validation. I think this is right, though for different reasons than Baker.
Propositional attitudes are products of derived representation, and, when it
comes to derived representation, thinking it is so makes it so—taking a content
to be represented is all that is required for derived representation. And so,
self-ascribing an attitude is all it takes for that attitude to really, actually exist.
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